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REVISITING SOCIAL GROUP AND NEXUS IN
GENDER ASYLUM CLAIMS: A UNIFYING
RATIONALE FOR EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE
Karen Musalo*
INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the term "particular social group" and the determi-
nation of what is commonly referred to as "nexus,"-the shorthand
term used in the refugee adjudication context to describe the required
causal connection between persecution and a Convention reason t-
may be among the most thorny interpretive issues in refugee law. As
the law relevant to the protection of women asylum seekers evolves, it
becomes increasingly apparent that the parameters of protection de-
pend to no small degree upon State interpretation and application of
these two key concepts.
Since 1999, the tribunals of three countries-the United Kingdom, 2
New Zealand 3 and Australia 4-have issued decisions addressing so-
cial group and nexus, with interpretations that are inclusive of
women's claims. In June 2002, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published guidelines on both social
group 5 and gender claims, 6 which affirm in many respects the ap-
* Resident Scholar, Director, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies. University of Califor-
nia. Hastings. I would like to thank Stephen Knight. Lory Rosenberg and Pamela Goldberg for
their contributions towards the development of gender asylum jurisprudence, as well as for their
thoughtful comments on this Article. In addition, deep gratitude to Richard A. Boswell for
helping me in every way to bring this article to fruition.
1. As discussed infra. the "Convention reasons" are race. religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group. and political opinion. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
opened for signature July 28. 1951. 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
2. Islam v. Sec'\, of State for the Home Dep't. 2 All E.R. 546 (1999), available at http://
www3.oup.co.uk/reflaw/hdb/VolumeI I/Issue_03/pdf/l 10496.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
3. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (1999). available at http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.niz/de-
fault.asp (last visited Feb. 11. 2003).
4. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar. (2002) 76 A.L.J.R. 667.
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal-ct/2002/574.html (last visited Mar. 6.
2003).
5. UNHCR. Guidelines on International Protection: Membership in a Particular Social
Group. 19 (HCR/GIP/02/01, May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Social Group Guidelines].
6. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the
Context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status
of Refugees (HCR/GIP/02/01. May 7. 2002) [hereinafter Gender Guidelines].
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proach taken by the three State tribunals. The jurisprudence in the
United States on these key issues has been more of a question mark
due to somewhat unusual developments, which included the issuance
of two seemingly inconsistent opinions, Matter of Kasinga7 and Matter
of R-A-, 8 followed by the intervention of then-Attorney General, Ja-
net Reno, who vacated the latter of the two. Matter of Kasinga was
roundly praised for opening the door to gender claims,9 while Matter
of R-A- was just as roundly condemned for slamming it shut.10 Even
in the wake of the Attorney General's vacating of the offending Mat-
ter of R-A- decision, commentators have characterized the U.S. posi-
tion on gender claims as being out of step with evolving jurisprudence,
and inconsistent with international norms."1
This Article examines the analytical approach that informed the key
decisions in these four countries-the United Kingdom, New Zealand,
Australia, and the United States-and finds that they share a unifying
rationale, which carries the potential to bring the United States fully
into step with the positive adjudicatory trends of the three other coun-
tries. This unifying rationale applies not only to the interpretation of
"particular social group," but more importantly goes to the nexus
analysis necessary to establish the causal connection between social
7. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
8. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated 22 1. & N. Dec. 1328 (A.G. 2001).
9. See, e.g.. Melanie Randall. Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on
Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 281 (2002) ("The decision in Matter of Kasinga is
hailed as a breakthrough insofar as it explicitly recognizes gender as a component of the 'particu-
lar social group' category."); Megan Annitto, Asylum for Victims of Domestic Violence: Is Pro-
tection Possible After In re R-A-?, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 785, 789 (2000) ("Kasinga is... part of a
gradually opening door in the United States through which women fleeing gender persecution
can seek asylum."): Connie M. Ericson. In re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Grounds for Asylum
for Women, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 671. 672 (1998).
10. Andrea Binder. Gender and the "Membership in a Particular Social Group" Category of
the 1951 Refugee Convention. 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167. 184 (2001):
The Board's en banc opinion in In re R-A- constitutes a binding landmark decision on
the question of whether violence against and persecution of women can serve as a basis
for political asylum in the U.S. The decision has garnered national and international
attention and has been widely criticized as being inconsistent with U.S. case law and
policy, and as having a devastating impact on asylum law.
Id.
Sharon Donovan, No Where to Run . . . No Where to Hide: Battered Women Seeking Asylum in
the United States Find Protection Hard to Come by: Matter of R-A-, 11 GEO. MASON U. Civ.
RTS. L.J. 301, 333 (2001) ("The BIA's decision represents a setback in the recognition of gender-
based asylum claims.").
11. Stephen Knight, Seeking Asylum from Gender Persecution: Progress Amid Uncertainty. 79
INTERPRETER RELEASES 689. 696 (2002) ("[D]iscretionary decisions that have been made since
control of the Department of Justice passed to Attorney General Ashcroft ... are not positive,
and indicate a heightened level of opposition and resistance to recognizing gender-based human
rights violations as a basis for asylum.").
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group membership and the feared persecution in cases involving per-
secution by non-State actors. The key element of the nexus determi-
nation in the decisions of all four countries is the employment of a
bifurcated analysis. The bifurcated approach does not limit the nexus
consideration to an analysis of the motives of the individual perpetra-
tor of the persecution, but includes societal and State factors in the
equation. Although there is a difference in rationale and articulation
of the bifurcated approach in the relevant U.S. decision, Matter of
Kasinga, as compared to the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Aus-
tralian decisions, there is sufficient similarity to reconcile the ap-
proaches. The recently-released UNHCR guidelines, which explicitly
adopt an analytical framework incorporating a bifurcated nexus analy-
sis, provide an additional basis for this unified approach to nexus
determination.
II. BACKGROUND
Few substantive areas of refugee law have drawn the sustained at-
tention that gender asylum 12 claims have. Beginning in 1985, when
the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the UNHCR 13 issued its first
conclusion on refugee women,' 4 and perhaps more notably since 1993,
when ExCom recommended that States develop appropriate guide-
lines for gender claims, 15 there has been a steady stream of develop-
ments. At current count, five countries have issued guidelines for
gender claims. Canada was the first in 1993,16 followed by the United
States (1995), 17 Australia (1996),18 the United Kingdom (2000), 19 and
12. The term "gender asylum" is used to describe claims for asylum in which either the form
of persecution or the reason for the persecution is related to gender.
13. The Executive Committee of the UNHCR was established in 1957. Its mandate includes
advising the UNHCR on protection matters. See Guy GOODWIN-GILL. THE REFUGEE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 9 (2d ed. 1996).
14. UNHCR Executive Committee. 36th Sess.. No. 39 $ k (1985). Conclusion on Refugee
Women and International Protection. available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/lexis/vtx/home (last
visited Feb. 11, 2003).
15. UNHCR Executive Committee. 44th Sess.. No. 73 $ e (1993). No. 73(XLIV)-1993. Con-
clusion on Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence. available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/
vtx/home (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
16. IMMIGRATION ANi) REFUGEE B. OF CAN.. GUIDELINES ON WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIM-
ANTS FEARING GENDER-RELATED PERSECUiON (Mar. 1993): IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE B. OF
CAN.. GUIDELINE 4: WOMEN REFUGEE CLAIMANTS FEARING GENDER- RELATED PERSECUTION:
UPDATE (Nov. 13. 1996).
17. OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS. U.S. IMMIGR. ANi) NATURALIZATION SERV., CONSIDERATION
FOR ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS FOR WOMEN (May 26. 1995).
18. AUSTL. DEP"T OF IMMIGR. AND MULTICULTURAi AFFAIRS. REFUGEE ANi) HUMANITA-
RIAN VISA APPLICANTS: GUIDELINES ON GENDER ISSUES FOR DECISION MAKERS (July 1996),
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines/guidelinesaust.pdf (last visited Mar. 3.
2003).
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Sweden (2001).20 The European Parliament approved two resolutions
on the issue, 2 1 and a European Union Council Directive developed as
part of the E.U. harmonization process also addresses it.22 The na-
tional legislation of Ireland 23 and South Africa 24 incorporate gender
persecution as a basis for protection. Against this backdrop of exten-
sive intergovernmental, executive and legislative activity on gender
asylum, the refugee determination tribunals of a number of States
have considered the issue and adjudicated gender-based claims. 25
A key catalyst for this activity has been the growing recognition that
there has historically been a failure of protection for women refugees.
The key international refugee instrument is the 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention or Convention)
and its 1967 Protocol. 26 It is gender neutral, defining a refugee as any
person with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race. religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion. '27 Notwithstanding its neutrality, commentators are
legion who observe that the Convention has been interpreted within a
male paradigm, which has resulted in the historic exclusion from pro-
tection of women. 2s It is this criticism, in tandem with the increasing
19. IMMIGRATION APPEAL AUIH. (U.K.). ASYLUM GENDER GUIDELINES (Nov. 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.iaa.gov.uk/GenInfo/Gender.pdf (last visited Mar. 3. 2003).
20. MIGRATION BD., LFGAL PRAC. DIV., GENDFR-nASEI) PERSECUTION: GUIDELINES FOR IN-
VESTIGATION AND EVALIUATION OF THE NEEDS OF WOMEN FOR PROTECTION (Mar. 28. 2001).
available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 7. 2003).
21. See HEAVEN CRAVLEY, REFUGEES AND GENDER: LAW AND PROCESS 14 (2001) (discuss-
ing 1984 resolution "calling upon States to consider women who have been victims of persecu-
tion as belonging to a *particular social group' within the definition of the Refugee Convention"
and a 1996 resolution urging "all Member States to adopt guidelines on women asylum seekers
as agreed by the UNHCR Executive Committee").
22. Final Version of the Proposal for a Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals and Stateless Persons as Refugees or as
Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection, art. 7. d, available at http://www.
ecre.org/eu developments/statqua.pdf (last visited Feb. 29. 2003).
23. Refugee Act of 1996, § 1(1). available at http://www.justice.ie/80256996005F3617/
vluFileCode2/flJWOD4RYH9F/$file/Refugeeo2OAct% 2OConsolidated.PDF (last visited Mar.
3. 2003).
24. Social group includes, "among others, a group of persons of particular gender. sexual ori-
entation. disability, class or caste." South Africa Refugee Act, art. l.xxxi, available at http://www.
lhr.org.za/projects/refugee/links.htm (last visited Mar. 3. 2003).
25. See, e.g.. The Center for Gender and Refugee Studies. Asylum Law Page, ait http://www.
uchastings.edu/cgrs/law/intl.html (last visited Mar. 3. 2003) (providing decisions from Australia,
Austria. Canada. Germany, New Zealand. Spain. and the United Kingdom).
26. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31. 1967. 19 U.S.T.
6223. 606 U.N.T.S. 167.
27. Id. at art. I.A(2).
28. See Gender Guidelines. supra note 6. 5 (noting that "[h]istorically the refugee definition
has been interpreted through a framework of male experiences, which means that many claims
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international attention to issues of women's human rights,2 9 that has
served as a key factor in the initiation of multiple measures addressing
gender asylum. A stated objective of the majority of these initia-
tives-guidelines, directives, legislation, etc.-is to incorporate a gen-
der perspective into substantive and procedural aspects 30 of the
refugee determination process. In practical terms, this means that
women should not be precluded from protection because their claims
differ in salient ways from those of men.
III. SOCIAL GROUP AND NEXus ANALYSIS
A. Defining Concepts-The Refugee Definition and
Barriers to Women's Claims
A refugee is defined as a person with a "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion."'3 1 The refugee definition
is understood to require proof of: (1) an objectively reasonable fear of
a harm which is serious enough to be considered "persecution," (2)
which is causally linked, or bears a "nexus" to race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
The barriers to women that arose from this definition were three-
fold. First, the harms inflicted on women were often not considered to
be persecution because they were condoned or required by culture or
of women ... have gone unrecognised"): Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Unequal Protection.
58 BULL. OF THE AiOMic Sci.. Nov./Dec. 2002. at 56. 59:
The definition [of refugee] came of age during the Cold War and has been interpreted
within an overwhelmingly male paradigm. The quintessential refugee was a political
dissident in the Soviet Union or one of its allies. -Persecution" was understood to
encompass beatings. torture, and political imprisonment, but not the multitude of viola-
tions that are inflicted mainly on women.
Id.
29. See, e.g.. Dorothy 0. Thomas. Women's /lionan Rights: From Visibilitv to Accointabilitv.
69 Si. JOHN'S L. REV. 217 (1995) (discussing the "increased recognition of human rights viola-
tions in the last decade. particularly in the realm of women's issues"): Charlotte Bunch, The
Global Campaign for Women's Huian Rights: Where Next After Vienna?. 69 Si. JoiiN'S L. REV.
171. 173 (1995) (reflecting on successes at the 1993 United Nations World Conference on
Women in Vienna. whose Declaration and Programme of Action "formally recognized the spe-
cific human rights concerns of women"): Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight. Steps loriward and
Steps Back: Uneven Progress in the Law of'Social Group and Gender-Based Claims in the United
States, 13 IN'L J. o REFUCHiE LAW 51, 52 (2001) (noting the "successful organizing and advo-
cacy of women at two world conferences, the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. which led to formal recog-
nition that 'the human rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, integral and indivisi-
ble part of universal human rights'").
30. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss procedural issues: for an overview of these
issues, see CRAV'LEY supra note 21. at 199-223.
31. See Refugee Convention. supra note 1. at art. 1.A(2).
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religion (e.g., female genital mutilation (FGM), repressive social
norms), disproportionately inflicted on women (e.g., domestic vio-
lence), or simply different from the harms suffered by men under sim-
ilar circumstances (i.e., men may be beaten while women may be
raped). 32 Second, the perpetrators of these harms were often non-
State actors, such as husbands, fathers, or members of the applicant's
extended community. Although some Convention parties accept per-
secution by non-State actors as a basis for protection where the gov-
ernment cannot or will not control these actors, this recognition has
been slow in coming and is not accepted by all parties to the Refugee
Convention. 33 Third, and perhaps most importantly, women are often
persecuted because of their gender, and gender is not one of the five
grounds in the Convention definition.
It was in response to these interpretive barriers that the UNHCR, 34
other U.N. bodies3 5 and various States issued their recommendations
and guidelines. Although cumulatively these measures cover a broad
range of substantive and procedural issues, they focus in on the key
issues-persecution, non-State actors, and nexus to a Convention
ground. To a great degree, they share a common approach on these
issues: (1) recommending the use of a human rights framework inclu-
32. For example, beatings and torture inflicted in a political context were adjudicated as politi-
cal persecution. while rape in the same context was not. See, e.g.. Campos Guardado v. I.N.S..
809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that a female asylum seeker forced to watch mutilation and
murder of male family members, and who was raped while perpetrators shouted political slogans
did not meet refugee definition). Immigration judges (IJ) have ruled that life under the Taliban
for Afghan women was unpleasant but did not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g.. Case
Summary, available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/summaries/100-199/summary129.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2003) (The decision of the IJ denying asylum was subsequently reversed in a per
curiam decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals). Immigration judges have also ruled that
female genital mutilation (FGM) was not persecution for a Convention reason, but a cultural
norm carried out for the benefit of the entire community: this was the initial decision of the IJ in
the Kasinga decision. See infra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
33. France and Germany are among the countries that do not generally recognize refugee
claims based on persecution by non-State agents. See ANDREA SUBHAN. ASYLUM IN THE E.U.
MEMBER STATES 11-12 (European Parliament. Directorate Gen. for Research. Working Paper
No. LIBE 108 EN. 2000).
34. See Conclusion on Refugee Women and International Protection. supra note 14: UNHCR
Executive Committee. 39th Sess.. No. 54 (1988). Conclusion on Refugee Women, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home (last visited Feb. 11. 2003): UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee, 41st Sess., No. 64 (1990), Conclusion on Refugee Women and International Protection.
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home (last visited Feb. 11. 2003): Conclusion on
Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence, supra note 15: Gender Guidelines, supra note 6.
35. See, e.g., Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (recommending
that "refugee and asylum laws should be broadened to include gender-based claims of persecu-
tion. including domestic violence"): Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, its Causes and Consequences. Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, U.N. Comm'n HR., 52d
Sess.. Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), pt IV. 142(o), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53 (1996).
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sive of women's rights for assessing whether a harm constitutes perse-
cution, with the corollary that persecution may include harms inflicted
in the private sphere by non-State actors; and (2) suggesting that
under appropriate circumstances women may constitute a particular
social group, and may be able to establish a nexus between the perse-
cution and their social group membership. A survey of recent juris-
prudence reveals that the "harm as persecution" issue has been less
intractable, and constituted less of a roadblock, than that of defining
women as a particular social group and finding a nexus between the
persecution suffered and their social group membership.
B. Nexus and the Definition of a Particular Social Group
The Refugee Convention requires a nexus between one or more of
its five grounds and the feared persecution. The nexus analysis in-
volves a two-step process: the identification of the relevant Conven-
tion ground, followed by the establishment of the causal connection
between this ground and the persecution. It is when women are per-
secuted for their gender, rather than for reasons common to both men
and women (as political opponents, or members of a disfavored eth-
nic, racial or religious group) that interpretive obstacles have arisen
because gender is not one of the five Convention grounds. Beginning
with its earliest pronouncements on the issue 36 the UNHCR recom-
mended that under certain circumstances, women could constitute a
''particular social group" and that nexus could be established on that
basis.
The acceptance that a particular social group may be defined in ref-
erence to gender was recognized in, and arose out of, principles estab-
lished in the influential decisions of Matter of Acosta37 in the United
States and Canada v. Ward 38 in Canada. These cases based their anal-
yses on two distinct but related concepts: the ejusdem generis39 rule of
interpretation and the non-discrimination principle. Applying the rule
of ejusdem generis, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Mat-
36. See Conclusion on Refugee Women and International Protection, supra note 14. k (rec-
ommending that "women asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their
having transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a
particular social group"). This recommendation was reiterated by the UNHCR in 1991. Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee
Women, 1 54, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991).
37. 19 1. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
38. [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
39. Literally, "of the same kind or class." BALLENTINE'S LAW DiCTIONARY 393 (1969).
"[W]here general words are used ... after specific terms, they are to be confined to things of the
same kind or class as the things previously specified." Id.
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ter of Acosta ruled that in order for the term "particular social group"
to be "of the same kind" as the other four grounds, it should be lim-
ited to characteristics that are immutable or fundamental. 40 The BIA
explicitly recognized sex as the type of characteristic that met this
requirement.
In Ward, the Supreme Court of Canada cited Matter of Acosta and
its ejusdem generis approach with approval. However, its analysis
went further, exploring the objectives of the Convention's drafters.
The Supreme Court of Canada found that "[u]nderlying the Conven-
tion is the international community's commitment to the assurance of
basic human rights without discrimination. ' 41 The Convention draft-
ers included race, religion, nationality, and political opinion because
they constituted clear examples of status and beliefs deserving of pro-
tection under international norms of non-discrimination. 42 The partic-
ular social group ground should, therefore, be interpreted to embrace
groups similar to the other four specifically stated categories, and to
reflect the non-discrimination principle. 43 As had the BIA in Matter
of Acosta, the Court in Ward adopted criteria going to the immutable
or fundamental nature of the defining characteristic and explicitly
40. The Board ruled:
The other grounds of persecution in the Act and the Protocol listed in association with
'membership in a particular social group" are persecution on account of "race." "relig-
ion," "nationality," and "political opinion." Each of these grounds describes persecu-
tion aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or con-
science that it ought not be required to be changed.
Applying the doctine of ejusdem generis, we interpret the phrase "persecution on ac-
count of membership in a particular social group" to mean persecution that is directed
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a com-
mon immutable characteristic .... Whatever the common characteristic that defines
the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities
or consciences.
In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 233.
41. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 733.
42. The Supreme Court in Ward quoted from Guy Goodwin-Gill as follows:
The references to "race, religion, nationality, membership of [sic] a particular social
group, or political opinion" illustrate briefly the characteristics of individuals and
groups which are considered worthy of special protection. These same factors have
figured in the development of the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in gen-
eral international law, and have contributed to the formulation of other fundamental
human rights.
Id. at 734.
43. "In distilling the contents of.. . 'particular social group', therefore, it is appropriate to find
inspiration in discrimination concepts." Id.
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identified gender as an example of a characteristic that is "innate" or
"unchangeable." 44
The only serious interpretive challenge to the immutable or funda-
mental criteria for social group formulation originated in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled in its 1986
decision of Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS45 that a voluntary associational re-
lationship between group members, rather than innate or fundamental
characteristics, was necessary to establish a particular social group.
This approach, also referred to as the "cohesion" requirement, has
been rejected by a number of tribunals,46 as well as the UNHCR in its
recently released guidelines. 47 The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in
2000 in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS48 and ruled that either immutable
characteristics or a voluntary relationship may form the basis for a
particular social group.
Decisions such as Matter of Acosta and Ward were extremely impor-
tant in affirming that a particular social group could be defined in ref-
erence to gender. However, this recognition only resolved half of the
nexus equation. The remaining, and more problematic, element has
been to establish the nexus, or causal relationship, between the gen-
der-defined social group and the feared persecution.
Much has been written about the nature of the nexus requirement, 49
which derives from the Convention language "for reasons of" (i.e.,
44. 1d. at 739.
45. 801 F.2d 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
46. The court in Islam stated:
The support in the case law for the Sanchez-Trujillo view is slender. In the literature on
the subject there is no support; see the criticism in Hathaway, the Law of Refugee
Status .... Considering that view on its merits I am satisfied that for the reasons given
in Acosta's case the restrictive interpretation of "particular social group" by reference
to an element of cohesiveness is not justified .... Loyalty to the text requires that one
should take into account that there is a limitation involved in the words "particular
social group" [based on principles of non-discrimination]. What is not justified is to
introduce into that formulation an additional restriction of cohesiveness.
Islam, 2 All E.R. at 555.
In his opinion. Lord Steyn noted that the recognition of homosexuals as a particular social group
was inconsistent with a requirement of cohesiveness, and that the tribunals of New Zealand,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden. Denmark, Canada, and the United States have found that
"homosexuals are capable of constituting a particular social group" within the meaning of the
Refugee Convention. Id.
47. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 6, 1 15. The Guidelines affirm the innate, immutable
criteria and state as a corollary that: "It follows that sex can properly be within the ambit of the
social group category, with women being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and
immutable characteristics."
48. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from
Human Rights Norms. 15 MICHi. J. INTI'i L. 1179 (1994): Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Di-
iension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKEtLY J. INTrL L. 1 (1997): Michelle Foster, Causation in
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"well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion"). Al-
though it is agreed that nexus requires a showing of some relationship
between the feared harm and Convention ground, there is great vari-
ance as to the nature of that relationship. 50 One of the most demand-
ing tests, which has been adopted by the United States, requires proof
that the persecutor was motivated by a Convention reason. Other
States have left open the question of what it means, or have indicated
that its meaning may vary depending on the context of the claim.5
1
The nexus requirement has posed a substantial barrier to gender
claims because adjudicators have been slow to accept a causal connec-
tion between an applicant's gender and the harm inflicted upon her.
The difficulty is exacerbated where the persecutor is a non-State actor,
and it is presumed that the motivation for the harm is "personal"
rather than related to gender. For example, in the United Kingdom,
New Zealand, Australian and United States cases discussed herein,
which involved domestic violence and FGM at the hands of private
actors, the claims were all initially rejected by adjudicators who ruled
that there was no causal link between the feared persecution and the
gender of the asylum applicant. On appeal, the nexus issue was favor-
ably resolved, and the approach adopted by the courts provides a pos-
itive framework for prospective gender claims.
In all five cases, the tribunals developed a bifurcated interpretive
framework that allowed the requisite causal connection to be estab-
lished in relation to either the non-State perpetrator or the State/soci-
ety. This bifurcated approach provides a unifying rationale for
evolving jurisprudence, and because it was employed in Matter of Kas-
inga, which continues as controlling authority, it provides the concep-
tual basis for aligning the United States with international trends.
Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265
(2002): Shayna S. Cook. Repairing the Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 223
(2002); James C. Hathaway, International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a
Convention Ground, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 210 (2002).
50. See, e.g., Musalo, supra note 49, at 1228-34 (discussing the tests used in criminal, tort, and
anti-discrimination law, and their applicability to nexus in the refugee context): Foster, supra
note 49, at 332-33 (discussing various causation standards in refugee law, as well as standards in
tort, equity and anti-discrimination law).
51. See infra notes 68, 92, and 109 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE UNITED KINGDOM, NEW ZEALAND, AND AUSTRALIA
A. Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and
Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shah
(Islam; Ex Parte Shah)
The first within the trilogy of decisions discussed in this section is
Islam; Ex Parte Shah. In this decision, the House of Lords considered
the conjoined appeals of two Pakistani women who fled marital vio-
lence. Although the individual circumstances of the two women were
different in various respects, both claims involved feared harm at the
hands of non-State actors in situations where the State failed to pro-
vide protection.5 2 In order to decide the case, the House of Lords had
to consider whether a particular social group could be defined by ref-
erence to gender and to determine if there was a requisite nexus be-
tween the feared persecution and the Convention ground. The House
of Lords answered in the affirmative on both counts, employing a bi-
furcated analysis to resolve the nexus issue.53
The first of the two appellants, Shahanna Islam, was a teacher. 54
Her husband had often been violent, but the catalyst for her flight was
false accusations of infidelity, which resulted from her efforts to inter-
vene in a fight between rival political factions at the school where she
taught. 55 Subsequent to these accusations, her husband assaulted her
so brutally that she was twice admitted to the hospital. Her attempts
to escape him within Pakistan by staying with her brother were unsuc-
cessful. 56 The second woman, Syeda Shah, had been forced out of her
family home by her husband, and shortly after arriving in the United
Kingdom, she gave birth. She feared that her husband would accuse
her of adultery, and either beat her himself or denounce her under
Sharia law for immorality, which could result in "lashes in public or
stoning to death." 57
The evidence in the record documented institutionalized discrimi-
nation against women in Pakistan. Although the Pakistani Constitu-
tion prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, "a woman's place in
society in Pakistan is low. ' '58 Domestic abuse is prevalent, which is
both "tolerated" and "sanctioned" by the State. 59 Women must sub-
52. Islam. 2 All E.R. at 548.
53. Id. at 557-58.
54. Id. at 549.
55. Id. at 550.
56. Id. at 549-50.
57. Id. at 549.
58. Islam. 2 All E.R. at 548.
59. Id.
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mit to the wills of their husbands, and women who are forced to leave
home, or who decide to leave, are at special risk because they can be
charged with adultery and/or sexual immorality. 60 In such cases, the
statutory law discriminates against women by prohibiting their testi-
mony, or considering them guilty unless they can establish themselves
to be innocent. 61
The decision makers below62 had not doubted that the fear of vio-
lence at the hands of the applicants' husbands was well-founded.
However, they rejected the argument that the applicants were mem-
bers of a particular social group 63 and that the persecution was linked
to this membership. In a four to one decision, the House of Lords
disagreed, finding that the women were members of a gender-defined
social group and, that although their husbands did not persecute them
for this reason, the State failed to protect them because they were
women. On this basis, a social group nexus could be established.
60. Id.
61. The decision quotes at length from a report of Amnesty International on Women in
Pakistan:
[S]everal Pakistani laws explicitly discriminate against women. In some cases they al-
low only the evidence of men to be heard, not of women. In particular. the Evidence
Act and the Zina Ordinance, one of four Hudood Ordinances promulgated in 1979.
have eroded women's rights and denied them equal protection by the law.
Women are also disadvantaged generally in the criminal justice system because of their
position in society . . . women are particularly liable to be punished under the Zina
Ordinance which deals with extramarital sexual intercourse .... Offenses under this
law attract different punishments according to the evidence on which the conviction is
based. In cases where the most severe (hadd) punishments may be imposed. the evi-
dence of women is not admissible.
In a rape case the onus of proof falls on the victim. If a woman fails to prove that she
did not give her consent to intercourse, the court may convict her of illicit sexual
intercourse.
The majority of cases tried under the Hudood laws result in convictions carrying the
less severe (ta'zir) punishments, but there are also some acquittals and a few convic-
tions involving the most severe (hadd) punishments ....
About half the women prisoners in Pakistan are held on charges of Zina .... Arrests
under the Zina Ordinance can be made without a magistrate first investigating whether
there is any basis for the charge and issuing a warrant. As a result, women in Pakistan
are often held under the Zina Ordinance for years although no evidence has ever been
produced that they have committed any offense. Men frequently bring charges against
their former wives, their daughters or their sisters in order to prevent them from mar-
rying or remarrying against the man's wishes ....
Most women remain in jail for two to three years before their cases are decided, often
on the basis of no evidence of any offense.
Id. at 548-49.
62. Id. at 550-51. The case had been considered by special adjudicators. the Immigration Ap-
peal Tribunal, and the Court of Appeal.
63. Id. at 550. Political opinion had also been argued and rejected by the adjudicators.
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Relying heavily on the BIA's decision in Matter of Acosta, as well as
on principles of non-discrimination, three of the four Lords in the ma-
jority (Steyn, Hoffman, and Hope of Craighead) defined the relevant
social group in terms of gender alone-"women in Pakistan. '64 The
fourth Lord (Hutton) accepted a narrower subset described as Pakis-
tani women suspected of adultery and unprotected by State and public
authorities. 65 All four Lords rejected the government's argument of
"cohesiveness" as a requirement. 66
After concluding that the women were "within the scope of the
words 'particular social group,'" the Lords turned to the question of
nexus between the persecution and membership in the gender-defined
social groups. The Lords concluded that the "serious harm" of
spousal violence was a "personal affair, directed against the applicants
as individuals '67 and therefore not causally linked to their gender-de-
fined social group status. However, the Lords observed that persecu-
tion was not limited to the husbands' actions, but was the result of the
separate and combined elements of the husbands' violence and the
failure of State protection. The recognition of two constituent ele-
ments allowed the bifurcated analysis; the Lords ruled that although
the husbands' actions were not linked to gender, the State's failure to
protect was, and on this basis. nexus to the Convention ground of par-
ticular social group could be established. 68
Lord Hoffman expressed the bifurcated approach by the formula:
Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection. Pursuant
to this formula, the required nexus is established if either of the con-
stituent elements of persecution are causally related to a Convention
reason. Alternatively expressed, Lord Hoffman's rule is:
Persecution has two elements; nexus is established if either is linked
to a Convention reason.
It can be expressed graphically as follows:
64. Islam, 2 All E.R. at 556. [he Lords were influenced by the Acosta decision in accepting a
broad gender-defined formulation: "The idea so incisively put forward by Lord Hoffmann [that
the social group is women in Pakistan] is neither novel nor heterodox. It is simply a logical
application of the seminal reasoning in Acosta's case [citation omitted]."
65. Id. at 557.
66. Id. at 552-56. 563. 568-69. 572.
67. Id. at 564 (per Lord Hoffman). 558 (per Lord Steyn).
68. As discussed in Section Il1(B) supra. a number of States. including the United Kingdom.
have left open the question of the particular test most appropriate for determining nexus. The
tests range from "sole cause." to "but for," to "contributing cause." Notable in this case is the
fact that the Lords ruled that the connection between the applicant's gender-defined social
group and the failure of state protection was so clear that nexus could be established 'irrespec-
tive" of which test was applied. I. at 558 (per Lord Hoffman).
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* Serious Hann
-- H Nexus is established if either one is
" Failure of State ~linked to a Convention reason
Protection
Its application to the Islam case is as follows:
" Serious Harm
(Spousal beating) nnexus
Convention reason
" Failure of State
Protection nexus - gener 
social grOUP
The House of Lords decision was historic because, by determining
nexus in reference to the individual persecutor as well as the State, it
found an analytical path around the barrier created by the characteri-
zation of family violence as "personal" rather than as a Convention
reason. Furthermore, its approach is consistent with the growing rec-
ognition of State responsibility to provide protection to its nationals
without discrimination. 69
Notwithstanding the enlightened approach taken by the Lords, one
might question the Lords' assumption that spousal violence-because
it is "individual" and private-is not causally related to gender. Al-
though, as discussed infra, this is the analysis adopted consistently in
domestic violence cases, it runs counter to a growing body of inter-
disciplinary literature on the issue. 70  Jurists decide cases on the
69. See, e.g., Rachel Bacon & Kate Booth, The Intersection of Refugee Law and Gender: Pri-
vate Harm and Public Responsibility: Islam; Ex Parte Shah Examined. 23 UNIV. NEW S. WALES
L. 135, 145 (2000) ("States are obliged to provide their nationals with effective protection from
all kinds of harm, and by extension, this includes private harm. Further. states must do so with-
out discrimination, for instance, on the basis of gender.").
70. Although a comprehensive discussion of the context and dynamic of domestic violence is
outside the scope of this Article, it should be noted that there is ample authority for affirming its
essential relationship to gender and to power relations between men and women. See, e.g.. Am-
ber Ann Porter, The Role of Domestic Violence in the Consideration of Gender-Based Asylum
Claims: In re R-A- An Antiquated Approach, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 333-34 (2001) ("Experts in
the field of domestic violence generally agree that treating domestic abuse as irrational acts
taken by disturbed individuals 'ignores that fact that domestic violence is intentional behavior
with a historical, culturally sanctioned purpose, which was and is for men to keep their wives in
place.") (emphasis added) (quoting Liane V. Davis. in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL WORK 780,
784 (19th ed. 1995)): Anita Sinha. Note. Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating
the 'Cultural Hook' for Claims involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562.
1587-88 (2001).
The majority's insistence [in Matter of R-A-] on specific evidence of what motivated the
persecutor blatantly ignores widely accepted understandings of what motivates domes-
tic battering. Feminist activists and lawmakers. beginning in the 1970s, drew attention
to the crisis of domestic abuse-women being threatened, beaten, and killed in their
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records before them, and it is unclear what evidence the Lords had
before them regarding the dynamic of domestic violence and its clear
gender component. Had the record reflected the current understand-
ing of domestic violence in this regard, it is certainly possible that the
Lords would have found a Convention reason inherent in both ele-
ments of persecution: the spousal beatings and the failure of State
protection. Such an analysis would look like this:
* Serious Harm nexus - gender socialgrou
(Spousal beating) P
Convention reason
* Failure of State
Protection 
nexu -
Although this approach would not have changed the outcome in the
Shah case, it may be relevant in jurisdictions where a bifurcated analy-
sis is not accepted.
B. New Zealand, Refugee Appeal No. 71427/9971
Several months after the House of Lords decided Shah; Ex Parte
Islam, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) of New Zea-
land issued a decision in a gender claim that involved similar issues-
persecution by a private actor (spouse) in a country with gender ine-
own homes. The battered women's movement, and recent studies documenting the
problem, have made domestic violence a matter of public concern in the United States
and have helped shape the current understanding of domestic violence as rooted in
both power structures of inequality and gender-biased social norms. Far from being
individual, random acts, violence against women at the hands of their partners is a
pervasive and systemic exercise of patriarchal power.
The Special Rapporteur for Violence against Women has also underscored the gender dimen-
sion of domestic violence, noting that it:
exists as a powerful tool of oppression. Violence against women in general, and domes-
tic violence in particular, serve as essential components in societies which oppress
women, since violence against women not only derives from but also sustains the domi-
nant gender stereotypes and is used to control women in the one space traditionally
dominated by women, the home.
Report of the Special Rapporteur for Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences.
U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1996/53, at 6 (1996).
The Presidential Task Force on Violence and the Family of the Am. Psychological Association
has similarly analyzed domestic violence, noting that generally batterers "use violence to meet
needs for power and control over others. Their actions are often fueled by stereotypical sex-role
expectations for 'their' women." AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N PRESIENTIAL TASK FORCE ON
VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY. REPORT OF THE AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N PRESIDENTIAL TASK
FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY (1996).
71. New Zealand. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99. available at http://www.uchastings.edu/cgrs/
law/intl/71427-99.html (last visited Feb. 12. 2003) [hereinafter Refugee Appeal].
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quality and failed State protection for women. The applicant 72 in the
New Zealand case was a citizen of Iran whose husband was a member
of the Revolutionary Guard. 73 The applicant's husband began to vio-
lently abuse her almost immediately after their arranged marriage and
escalated his abuse when she became pregnant. 74 After she gave
birth, he arranged for the baby to be taken away from her, and he told
her that the child had died.75 He stated that "there was no reason for
her to continue living with him as he did not love her and there was no
baby to look after."' 76 He divorced her, and it was only then that the
applicant learned her child had not in fact died. Her subsequent ef-
forts to obtain access to the child brought further harassment from her
husband, and from his friend in the Revolutionary Guard. Ultimately,
the applicant obtained de facto custody of the child, which enraged
her husband who considered it as an "embarrassment to him both as a
man and as an official."'77 After an incident in which the applicant's
ex-husband beat her mother in an attempt to find the applicant and
the child, the applicant decided to flee Iran.78 About a year before
she had made the decision to flee Iran, a childhood friend of the appli-
cant had proposed marriage. Out of fear that she would lose the de
facto custody of her son, she entered into a "temporary." 79 as opposed
to "permanent," marriage. Her second husband helped her and the
child escape and planned to join them afterwards. He was, however,
unable to get out. The applicant later learned that he had been
beaten, arrested, and otherwise harassed by the applicant's first
husband.
Relying upon scholarly sources and human rights reports, the
RSAA decision began with an "[o]verview of the institutionalised and
72. The Refugee Status Appeals Authority maintains the confidentiality of asylum applicants.
and therefore the name of the applicant in this case is unknown.
73. See Refugee Appeal. supra note 71. $ 14.
74. Id. $ 16.
75. ld. T 20.
76. Id. 21.
77. Id. 91 27.
78. Id. 91 33.
79. See Refugee Appeal. supra note 71. 9 32.
Marriage, according to the current Iranian law, consists of two kinds-permanent and
temporary. In permanent marriage, as the name indicates, no duration is specified in
the marriage contract. Temporary marriage. also known as sigheh. on the other hand.
can last only for a specific period of time. In permanent marriage, a wife enjoys a
higher degree of security and respect within the family. In temporary marriage, on the
other hand. matrimonial relations are considered terminated and the wife must leave
the husband's residence as soon as the specified period is over or if the husband waives
his right to the remaining portion of the said period.
hi. 91 4(e).
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state-sanctioned discrimination against women in the Iranian family
context."'80 The RSAA's decision noted that in every aspect of mar-
riage, divorce, and custody, the woman is subservient to the man.
Women cannot choose their spouses without the consent of their fa-
ther or paternal grandfathers. 8' Men can divorce at will, while women
can divorce only upon proof of "undue hardship. '82 Men can have
several permanent spouses and unlimited temporary spouses; women
cannot.8 3 Legal custody of children automatically belongs to the fa-
ther and paternal grandfather, although the actual care of the child
can be conferred on the mother. 84 After reviewing the inequalities
relating to marriage, divorce, and custody rights, the RSAA decision
examined penal provisions, as well as law and policy related to domes-
tic violence. The RSAA concluded that "[g]ender discrimination is
• . . the central feature of the Iranian penal code, '8 5 and that "the
attitude to domestic violence by the Iranian state is one of condona-
tion, if not complicity. ' 86
The New Zealand tribunal explicitly adopted the Shah formula
(Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection). As in
Shah, the applicant's husband was a source of serious harm in the
form of "physical and psychological violence, '8 7 and the State failed
to provide protection. The failure of protection was not only the re-
sult of State inaction; the tribunal commented that Iran "condone[d],
if not actively encourage[d], non-state actors such as husbands or for-
mer husbands to cause serious harm to women." 88
As did the Lords in Shah, the tribunal found that the husband's
actions were not "for reasons of" one of the Convention grounds, ob-
serving that it would be "artificial" to try to fit them within that con-
text in light of the multiple "causes of violence in the home." 89 There
was a clear nexus, however, between the State's actions and the
grounds of social group, political opinion, and religion 9 -with a gen-
der-defined social group being the overarching factor. A number of
80. Id. 3.
81. 1d. I 4(e).
82. Id. 4(l).
83. Id. 40).
84. See Refugee Appeal. supra note 71. T 4(n).
85. Id. 1 6.
86. Id. 10.
87. Id. 1 79.
88. Id. T 118.
89. Id. $ 116.
90. See Refugee Appeal. supra note 71. $ 86-88. Because Iran is a theocracy and manv of
the gender norms are characterized as religious dictates, the tribunal identified religion and po-
litical opinion as feasible grounds.
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precedent decisions-including Shah, Ward, and Matter of Acosta9 1-
considered in light of the basic anti-discrimination principles of the
Refugee Convention, supported the formulation of a social group
based on gender alone. As did Lord Steyn in Shah, the New Zealand
tribunal found the nexus satisfied even in the absence of articulating
the "appropriate causation test."'92
When incorporated into the "persecution/nexus" framework de-
scribed above, the New Zealand tribunal's decision looks like this:
• Serious Harm
(Abuse and harassment no nexus
by ex-husband)
Convention reason
* Failure of State Protection _ gender social grouP,
political opinio 
n & religion
One notable distinction between the analysis in this decision and
that of Shah is that the New Zealand tribunal found that considered
cumulatively, the discriminatory measures against women in Iran con-
stituted serious harm.93 The significance of this finding is that a
woman in Iran under appropriate circumstances-even in the absence
of spousal abuse-could qualify for refugee status.
C. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar
This decision by the High Court of Australia constitutes the third in
this trilogy of decisions applying a bifurcated nexus and affirming that
women victims of family violence may qualify for protection as mem-
bers of a persecuted social group. The Pakistani asylum seeker in this
case, Naima Khawar, claimed that she had been physically abused and
threatened with death by her husband and members of his family.94
She had been hospitalized with injuries from beatings, and threatened
by her husband and his family that she would be disfigured with acid
or burned alive. 95 On one occasion, her husband and his brother
"doused her with petrol" and only stopped when neighbors inter-
vened. 96 Ms. Khawar stated that she had gone to the police on four
91. See supra notes 37-40, 64 and accompanying text.
92. See Refugee Appeal, supra note 71, 115.
93. "Taking into account the cumulative effect of these breaches on the appellant, our conclu-
sion is that the policy of gender discrimination and the enforcement of gender-based norms
against women as a group in Iran is of a nature which permits a finding of persecution." Id. 78.
94. Khawar, 76 A.L.J.R. 667. 50.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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occasions to report the violence, but the police never took her com-
plaints seriously or acted on them. When she reported the dousing
with petrol incident, the officer "told her that women always tried to
blame their husbands for problems for which they themselves were
the real cause."'97
Ms. Khawar had submitted "substantial" evidence on the status of
women in Pakistan: the documentation addressed gender discrimina-
tion in the legal system; the existence of widespread impunity in cases
of killing or mutilation of women; and the failure of the police to act
in cases of domestic violence.98 She argued that her persecution was
on account of various gender-defined social groups, including women,
married women in Pakistan, married women in Pakistan without the
protection of a male relative, married women in Pakistan suspected of
adultery, or women who have transgressed the mores of Pakistani
society.99
Ms. Khawar's claim for protection in Australia was denied in the
first instance and she appealed to the administrative body, the Refu-
gee Review Tribunal (RRT). Anonymous sources submitted informa-
tion to the RRT accusing Ms. Khawar of fabricating her story. The
RRT did not make a credibility determination, ruling instead that
even if her facts were true, she would not qualify for relief because
"those harming her [her husband and his family] were not motivated
by her membership of any particular social group, but by purely per-
sonal considerations related to the circumstances of her marriage, the
fact that she brought no dowry to the family and their dislike of her as
an individual." 100 In so ruling, the RRT did not make a determination
whether Ms. Khawar was a member of a particular social group, or a
factual finding regarding the failure of State protection. 10' Ms.
Khawar appealed to the Federal Court. Judge Branson ruled that the
RRT had erred in not deciding these two issues because:
[h]ad the [Tiribunal made a finding that [Mrs. Khawar] was a mem-
ber of a social group in Pakistan which was comprised of Pakistani
women, or alternatively married Pakistani women, it may well have
concluded, as Lord Steyn did on the evidence in ... [Ex parte Shah]
that:
"Given the central feature of state-tolerated and state-sanctioned
gender discrimination, the argument that the appellants fear perse-
97. Id. 91 94.
98. Id. 97.
99. Id. I[ 52.
100. Khawar, 76 A.L.J.R. 667. 13.
101. Id. 9155.
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cution not because of their membership of a social group but be-
cause of the hostility of their husbands is unrealistic."' 02
Judge Branson's decision was upheld by the full Federal Court, fol-
lowing which the government (the Minister for Immigration and Mul-
ticultural Affairs) sought review of the case in the High Court of
Australia.
Addressing only the legal issues raised by Ms. Khawar's claim, the
High Court ruled four to one that a successful claim for protection
could be established on the theory of a gender-defined social group in
a context of gender discrimination and resultant failed State protec-
tion. The four Justices in the majority (Justices Gleeson, McHugh,
Gummow, and Kirby) issued three opinions, with McHugh and Gum-
mow issuing a joint opinion. In each of the opinions, the Justices
stated that the relevant social group could simply be "women."10 3 Jus-
tice Gleeson observed in his opinion that "[w]omen in any society are
a distinct and recognisable group."10 4 The Justices did not rule out
that the appropriate social group could be defined as "gender +" other
characteristics, which would result in a narrower group.10
On the related issue of nexus, the analysis of the Australian High
Court was strikingly similar to that of the House of Lords and Refu-
gee Status Appeals Authority. First, the High Court adopted the same
bifurcated nexus approach, expressed by the formulation that "Perse-
cution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection" and stated that
on this basis, the nexus requirement could be met when either the
serious harm or failure of State protection is "for reasons of a Con-
vention ground." 10 6 Second, the High Court assumed0Y-as had the
other two tribunals-that the motivation for the non-State actors
(husband and family) was not related to Ms. Khawar's membership in
a gender-defined social group, regardless of the specific formula-
tion.t 18 Third, the Court was less than definitive as to the particular
test it employed to establish nexus or causation. Justice Kirby's opin-
ion commented most extensively on this element. He stated that al-
though some "singling" out for a Convention reason is required to
102. Id.
103. Id. 35, 83 127-29.
104. Id. 35.
105. Id. 81.
106. Khawar. 76 A.L.J.R. 667, 120.
107. The tribunals in the United Kingdom and New Zealand made findings on this issue,
while Justice Kirby of the Australian High Court stated that he "accepted for the purposes of
argument" the fact that the private actors were not motivated for a Convention reason. Id.
123.
108. Id.
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establish causation, the motivation or intention for this singling out
need not arise from emnity or malignant intentions.10 9 Finally, the
Court evoked the "history and broad humanitarian object of the Con-
vention"110 in reaching its determination that the bifurcated nexus
analysis, which considers serious harm and failure of State protection,
is consistent with the multilateral treaty's intent.I''
Because it limited its review to legal issues, the High Court did not
make a ruling on Ms. Khawar's specific claim for protection. The
High Court remanded the case to the RRT to make the required fac-
tual findings and apply the articulated framework 1 2 to the facts.
V. THE UNITED STATES: MATTER OF KASINGA' 1 3 AND
MATTER OF R-A- 14
The two most significant gender cases in the United States have
been the decisions of the BIA in Matter of Kasinga and Matter of
R-A-, decided respectively in 1996 and 1999. Matter of Kasinga in-
volved the claim of a young woman from Togo fleeing FGM and
forced polygamy. In a landmark decision, which accepted a gender-
defined social group and applied a bifurcated nexus analysis-similar,
but not identical, to that of the preceding cases-the BIA ruled eleven
to one to grant asylum. In an apparent about face, in Matter of R-A-,
which arose out of the claim of a Guatemalan woman who had en-
dured ten years of brutal domestic violence, a majority of the BIA 1 5
rejected a gender-defined social group and refused to apply any form
of bifurcated analysis.
109. Id.
110. Id. $ 110.
111. The court stated:
ITihe Convention is one of several important international treaties designed to redress
"violation[s] of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection." It is
the recognition of the failure of state protection, so often repeated in the history of the
past hundred years, that led to the exceptional involvement of international law in mat-
ters concerning individual human rights. In that context, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (to both of which Australia is a party) are obviously
important in expressing the concept of women's equality before the law and the unac-
ceptability of the state and its agencies discriminating unjustly against women solely by
reason of their sex.
Id. 91 I l1 (footnotes omitted).
112. The framework is no different from that established by the House of Lords and the
RSAA. For an extended discussion of the Khawar decision, see Stephen M. Knight. Reflections
on Khawar: Recognizing the Refugee from Family Violence, HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2003).
113. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357.
114. In re R-A-. 22 1. & N. Dec. 906.
115. The Board was sharply divided in a ten to five decision.
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The BIA's decision in Matter of R-A- was widely criticized as incon-
sistent with precedent, as well as developing gender norms, including
the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) own guidelines.' 1 6
These criticisms appeared to be taken seriously by former Attorney
General Janet Reno, who took the unusual step of exercising her au-
thority to review and vacate Matter of R-A-, 117 remanding it back to
the BIA. Reno's order instructed the BIA to reconsider the case
under a set of proposed amendments to the asylum regulations that
had been drafted by the INS and published on December 7, 2000 in
the Federal Register.' 18 To date, these proposed regulations have yet
to be issued as final. It is unclear whether the Bush administration
will choose to move forward and ultimately issue these proposed regu-
lations. Significant for purposes of this analysis, however, is the fact
that the vacating of Matter of R-A- leaves Matter of Kasinga as the
most relevant authority on gender asylum claims. It is on this basis
that the unifying rationale of a bifurcated nexus analysis can be
reinvigorated.
A. Social Group and Bifurcated Analysis in Matter of Kasinga
Fauziya Kasinga, a native of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-
Kunsuntu ethnic group, requested asylum to escape FGM 19 and
forced polygamy. Her father, a rich and successful businessperson,
was not in agreement with FGM or forced or polygamous marriages.
While he was living, he protected his daughter from these customs. 20
When she was sixteen, her father died suddenly. Ms. Kasinga's pater-
nal relatives took control of her life and forced her to become the
fourth wife of a forty-five-year-old man who told her she would be
required to undergo FGM as his wife. With the help of her mother
and sister, Ms. Kasinga fled Togo and sought asylum in the United
States.1 2'
116. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
117. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906.
118. 65 Fed. Reg. 76588-98 (Dec. 7, 2000).
119. Female genital mutilation is the practice by which a portion or all of the female genitals
are removed. Type I clitoridectomy involves the partial or complete removal of the clitoris.
Type II clitoridectomy (excision) involves the excision of the clitoris and part of the labia mi-
nora. Type III infibulation involves the removal of the clitoris, labia minora. and parts of the
labia majora. Type IV infibulation involves the same amount of cutting, but the labia majora are
sutured together to cover the urethra and the vagina, leaving a very small opening by inserting a
reed or piece of wood for the passage of urine and menstrual blood. Nahid Toubia. Female
Circumcision as a Public Health Issue, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 712-16 (1994). The form of FGM
to which Ms. Kasinga's was to be subjected was Type IV.
120. In re Kasinga. 21 1. & N. Dec. at 358.
121. Id.
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The record in Ms. Kasinga's case documented extensive discrimina-
tion against women in Togo. 122 Discrimination in the educational
arena resulted in a far higher rate of illiteracy among women than
their male counterparts. Men decided whether their wives were per-
mitted to work and controlled their salaries. Violence against women,
including wife beating, was pervasive and there was little police inter-
vention. In addition, the specific practices upon which the claim was
based-FGM, forced marriage, and polygamy-were documented as
widespread among members of the applicant's ethnic group, the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu. 123 It was often midwives or elders who carried
out the FGM itself, which they believed was a positive act for the
young woman and larger community.
At first instance, an immigration judge denied her claim. The judge
found Ms. Kasinga not credible, but alternatively ruled that even if
she were credible, she did not qualify for relief because FGM was not
persecution, and it was not linked to one of the five "enumerated
grounds" (i.e., Convention reasons). 124 The BIA reversed the immi-
gration judge and ruled that FGM was persecution, and the applicant
had established the requisite nexus between FGM and a gender de-
fined social group. The particular social group was described as
"[y]oung women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe, who have not had
FGM as practiced by the tribe, and who oppose the practice."' 25 Al-
though the BIA did not refer to it as such, it adopted a bifurcated
analysis by considering nexus in relation to both the non-State actors
(i.e., those who carried out the FGM) and the State/society. The
BIA's ruling that the requisite nexus had been established is all the
more significant when one considers that the nexus test in the United
States is far more rigid than that of the other States herein discussed.
B. INS v. Zacarias: The Nexus "Test" and Its Application in
Matter of Kasinga
The tribunals of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia
explicitly stated that they were not bound to a specific test (e.g., "but
for," "effective cause") in determining nexus between the feared per-
secution and one of the five Convention grounds. In contrast, ever
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in INS v.
122. Karen Musalo. In re Kasinga: A Big Step Forward for Gender-Based As 'lOm Claims. 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 853, 854 (1996): Brief for Respondent at 3-4, In re Kasinga. 21 1. & N.
Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (on file with author).
123. See Musalo. supra note 122. at 854.
124. Id. at 855.
125. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 365.
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Zacarias,126 proof of the perpetrator's intent or motivation to perse-
cute because of one of the five grounds has been required to establish
nexus.
Prior to Matter of Kasinga, the nexus analysis in U.S. jurisprudence
appeared to be limited to the motivations of the actual perpetrator of
harm. The analysis did not include-as did the decisions in the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia-an examination of the role
and motivations of the State or society. In addition, prior to Matter of
Kasinga, the intent to persecute because of one of the five grounds
was assumed to require a malignant motivation, rather than a simple
causal connection. This exclusive focus on the actual perpetrator and
the perception that a punitive or malignant intent was required, po-
tentially caused an obstacle in Matter of Kasinga because the "perpe-
trators" of the feared harm of FGM were the midwives or elders who
performed the rite. They did not have an intent to punish for a Con-
vention reason; to the contrary, "presumably most of... [them] be-
lieve that they are simply performing an important cultural rite that
bonds the individual to society." 127 Viewed only in this limited con-
text, the required nexus would fail because the claim would look like
this:
Persecution of FGM 0 Convention reason
performed by elders no nexus - because not imposed to
punish for a Convention reason
In other words, the harm would not be found to have a punitive or
malignant intent, nor would it be considered to be imposed with the
intention of overcoming a protected status or trait (i.e., race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or particular social group). The argu-
ment, which was made on Ms. Kasinga's behalf addressed these issues,
and suggested that the proper analysis would determine nexus not
126. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). INS v. Zacarias involved the claim of a young Guatemalan male
who feared being killed by the anti-government guerrillas of his country for his refusal to join
their forces. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected his claim, ruling that he had failed to prove that
the guerrillas would kill or otherwise harm him for his political opinion rather than because of
his refusal to fight with them. In other words, he had failed to show that his persecutors were
motivated by his political opinion, rather than by other non-protected factors. Id.
The Supreme Court's "proof of intent" test for establishing nexus has been criticized for pos-
ing considerable impediments to protection. The principle obstacles arising from the require-
ment are two-fold. First, as an evidentiary matter, it is frequently difficult to establish the state
of mind or motivation of the persecutor. Second, it may often be the case that harm which is not
imposed with the intent of punishing for a Convention reason has the effect of so punishing. See
Musalo, supra note 49, at 1186, 1214-19.
127. INS Reply Brief at 16. In re Kasinga. 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.l.A. 1996) (on file with
author).
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solely by reference to the individual perpetrators of FGM, but within
a broader societal context. Documentation demonstrated that al-
though the midwives and elders who carried out the FGM may have
had only positive intentions, the societal objectives were less benign.
The practice of FGM had "patriarchal underpinnings," was carried
out for the purpose of "gender subjugation," and was "the most dras-
tic measure taken by any society to control women's sexuality and
reproduction."' 128 The BIA accepted that these factors could be dis-
positive. In its decision, the BIA ruled that the applicant had estab-
lished nexus in light of evidence that FGM was a form of "sexual
oppression" with the societal objective of assuring "male dominance
and exploitation." 129
This analytical formulation bears significant resemblance to the for-
mulations in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia in its
use of a bifurcated analysis and its willingness to determine nexus, not
only in relationship to the individual perpetrator of the harm, but in
the broader State/societal context. The formulation arising from Mat-
ter of Kasinga looks like this:
no neAus - because no ntent to
Serious harm of Pumishfor a Coniventon reaon
FGM by elders
Convention reason
" Societal objectives ____
underlying FGM nex. - becase 
intent related to
gender social grouP
The social group accepted by the BIA was defined by gender,
ethnicity, and opposition to FGM. In contrast to the decisions such as
Shah and Khawar, there was no extensive discussion as to whether the
appropriate social group would be defined by gender alone, or gender
in combination with other defining characteristics. The BIA simply
cited Matter of Acosta for the principle that a particular social group is
one that is defined by immutable or fundamental characteristics and
found that the applicant's gender and tribal affiliation were immuta-
ble, and her opposition to FGM was fundamental, therefore, she
should not have to change.
128. Transcript of oral argument before the Board on behalf of Fauziya Kasinga. at 53-54. In
re Kasinga. 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (on file with author).
129. In re Kasinga. 21 1. & N. Dec. at 366.
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C. Matter of R-A-: A Temporary Step Back from the
Unifying Rationale
Rodi Alvarado, the Guatemalan asylum seeker in Matter of R-A-,
had been the victim of extreme spousal violence for over ten years.
Her husband, a former soldier, broke windows and mirrors with her
head, whipped her with electrical cords, pistol-whipped her, raped and
sodomized her, and kicked her in the genitalia, causing severe bleed-
ing.130 Her attempts to secure protection through the police and judi-
cial system were futile. The police told her they would not get
involved, while a judge to whom her complaints had been referred
told her that he "would not interfere in domestic disputes."'131 After
unsuccessfully trying to hide from her husband within Guatemala,
Rodi Alvarado fled to the United States and requested asylum.
Documentation from a range of sources established a bleak picture
regarding the status of women in Guatemala. During the relevant
time period, there was de jure gender discrimination reflected in the
Guatemalan civil code, which recognized the "male as the married
couple's legal representative; the female [as] in charge of child care
and other domestic responsibilities."1 32 The civil code also provided
that the husband could "legally forbid his wife to engage in activities
outside the home" and accorded to the husband "the primary author-
ity in disposing of joint property."1 33 Such provisions, which denied
women equality under the law, prompted the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination to express "increased . . . concern at the
discrimination institutionalized in law."1 34 Domestic violence in Gua-
temala was pervasive, reflected entrenched cultural attitudes, and re-
sulted in a failure of adequate response by the police and courts.135
On the authority of the BIA's Matter of Kasinga decision, an immi-
gration judge granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado, finding that the perse-
cution of spousal abuse was on account of her membership in a
gender-defined social group, as well as her political opinion. 36 The
social group was "gender +"-defined by gender, nationality, and
130. In re R-A-. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 5-9.
131. Karen Musalo. Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and Its Implications. 75 IN-
TERPRETER RELEASES 1177, 1179 (1999).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The political opinion aspects of the decision are outside the scope of this Article, which is
focused on gender-defined social groups and the use of a bifurcated analysis. For a discussion of
the political opinion analysis in Matter of R-A-. see id. at 1183.
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marital status.1 37 The nexus analysis took into consideration the
broader societal context in which the abuse took place. 138
On appeal, a majority of the BIA reversed the ruling. It ruled that
the social group described by the immigration judge did not constitute
a particular social group. The BIA held that the immutable or funda-
mental criteria of Matter of Acosta and Matter of Kasinga were only
threshold requirements. To establish a cognizable social group, an in-
dividual also was required to demonstrate that members of the group
"understand their own affiliation with the grouping as do other per-
sons in the particular society," and the harm suffered (e.g., spousal
abuse) "is itself an important societal attribute, or in other words, that
the characteristic of being abused is one that is important within Gua-
temalan society."139
The BIA ruled that the group defined by gender, nationality, and
marital status did not meet these additional criteria because its mem-
bers are not "recognized and understood to be a societal faction" and
there is no evidence that "women are expected by society to be
abused."' 40 Furthermore, even if the social group were cognizable,
the claim would fail for failure to establish nexus. According to the
BIA majority, the husband/persecutor's motivation was unrelated to
the applicant's membership in the designated social group.
In its dissent, five members of the BIA disagreed that the husband
was not motivated for reasons related to her gender and invoked the
Shah decision for its bifurcated nexus analysis. The majority explicitly
rejected Shah and the bifurcated approach, ruling that "[w]e under-
stand the 'on account of' test to direct an inquiry into the motives of
the entity actually inflicting the harm." 141 The BIA's formulation in
Matter of R-A- would appear to be as follows:
137. The IJ defined the social group as "Guatemalan women who have been involved inti-
mately with Guatemalan male partners who believe that women are to live under male domina-
tion." In re R-A-. 21 1. & N. Dec. at 12.
138. The IJ ruled: "The Board recently held that an asylum applicant who was unwilling to
undergo female genital mutilation (FGM) had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
her membership in a social group of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have
not had FGM. as practiced by that tribe, and who opposed the practice." Id. at 31.
The board recognized FGM as a form of sexual oppression to assure male dominance and ex-
ploitation. In similar ways the acceptance of spousal abuse assures male dominance and ex-
ploitation by enabling men to exert control over their female companions through threats or acts
of violence. See also Musalo. supra note 131. at 1180.
139. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. at 31.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
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* Serious harm of
spousal abuse no nexus
Convention reason
* Societal objectives nexus - because irrelevant
On January 19, 2001, then-Attorney General Janet Reno vacated
the BIA's decision in Matter of R-A-. As a result, Matter of Kasinga is
the controlling authority for defining social group and determining
nexus. This provides an opportunity for U.S. jurisprudence to further
develop the bifurcated nexus analysis first articulated in Matter of
Kasinga. The analysis has become increasingly significant in the deci-
sions of other Convention parties and, as discussed below, constitutes
the analytical approach recommended in recently released UNHCR
guidelines.
VI. THE UNHCR GUIDELINES ON SOCIAL GROUP AND GENDER
As part of its process of Global Consultations, 142 in May 2002, the
UNHCR issued guidelines on both membership in a particular social
group 43 and gender-related persecution. 144 The guidelines, which are
intended to provide broad interpretive guidance, 145 are significant for
affirming gender-defined social groups and expressly adopting the bi-
furcated nexus analysis discussed above. The two sets of guidelines
overlap in their areas of coverage and are mutually reinforcing.
A. The Definition of Social Group in the Guidelines
The Social Group Guidelines (Guidelines) recommend an ex-
panded definition of social group, which incorporates the following
two principal approaches in State practice: (1) the "protected charac-
teristic approach," which recognizes groups united by immutable and
fundamental characteristics: and (2) the "social perception" approach,
which recognizes groups perceived by society as being a cognizable
group. The cases discussed in Section IV have primarily relied upon
142. The Global Consultations marked the fiftieth anniversary of the drafting of the U.N.
Refugee Convention and included a process of research and dialogue regarding key aspects of
the refugee definition and contemporary refugee issues. For more on the Global Consultations.
visit the UNHCR's website. at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/global-consultations.
143. See Social Group Guidelines, supra note 5.
144. See Gender Guidelines, supra note 6.
145. The Guidelines. which are issued pursuant to UNHCR mandate, are "intended to pro-
vide legal interpretive guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the
judiciary, as well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status determinations in the field." They
replace prior guidelines on the same topics, and are to be "read in conjunction with the UNHCR
Handbook." 1d. at 1.
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the protected characteristic approach, but the Guidelines observe that
a number of States have recognized women as constituting a particu-
lar social group under both the protected characteristic and social per-
ception approaches.
The Guidelines articulate the standard resulting from the merger of
the protected characteristic and social perception approaches as
follows:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a com-
mon characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who
are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be
one which innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental
to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human rights. 146
The Guidelines note that women meet the social group definition
both because of their "innate and immutable characteristics" and due
to the fact that in society they "are frequently treated differently
[than] men." 147 In underscoring the viability of gender-based social
groups, the Guidelines expressly state that size of the group "is not a
relevant criterion,"1 48 and they reject the "cohesion" requirement,
which, as discussed in Section III.B, has its origins in the Sanchez-
Trujillo decision. On this point, the Guidelines provide that because
cohesion is not a requirement, "women may constitute a particular
social group under certain circumstances based on the common char-
acteristic of sex, whether or not they associate with one another based
on that shared characteristic." 149
Although the Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution (Gender
Guidelines) note that any of the five Convention grounds may be im-
plicated in women's claims, it recognizes that women's claims have
often come within the social group ground "making a proper under-
standing of this term of paramount importance."1 50 The Gender
Guidelines expressly adopt the standard established in the Social
Group Guidelines, and reiterate its applicability to women."51 As did
the Social Group Guidelines, the Gender Guidelines repudiate those
factors that have been relied on to negate gender-defined social
groups, namely, the size of the group and the requirement of cohesive-
ness/voluntary association.15 2
146. See Social Group Guidelines, supra note 5, 11.
147. Id. 1 12.
148. Id. $ 18.
149. Id. T 15.
150. See Gender Guidelines. supra note 6, $ 28.
151. Id. 9 29-30.
152. Id. 9 31.
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B. The Nexus Analysis
The Guidelines on Social Group and Gender-Related Persecution
adopt without reservation the bifurcated analysis that characterized
the decisions from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
Nexus is established where the actions of the State or the non-State
actor is related to a Convention reason. The Social Group Guidelines
express the rule as follows:
The causal link may be satisfied: (I) where there is a real risk of
being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor for reasons which
are related to one of the Convention grounds, whether or not the
failure of the State to protect the claimant is Convention related; or
(2) where the risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State
actor is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or un-
willingness of the State to offer protection is for a Convention
reason.
153
Although the Social Group Guidelines have a broader application
than gender, they make it quite clear that the bifurcated analysis is
intended to help resolve the controversy over nexus in gender cases
(i.e., the guidelines mention domestic violence as an example of a
claim benefitting from the bifurcated approach). 54 The unequivocal
adoption of this approach in the two sets of guidelines provides a wel-
come clarity to the UNHCR's position on the issue. By affirming the
approach taken explicitly by the tribunals of the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand, and implicitly by the United States in
Matter of Kasinga, the UNHCR has made an important contribution
to the evolving jurisprudence on the issue of gender persecution. Al-
though its recommendations are non-binding, as the weight of author-
ity supporting this interpretive approach grows, it will be increasingly
difficult for States to reject this analytical approach and deny protec-
tion to women fleeing gender-related persecution.
153. See Social Group Guidelines. supra note 5, $ 23. Paragraph 21 of the Gender Guidelines
articulate the same rule:
In cases where there is a risk of being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor (e.g.
husband, partner or other non-State actor) for reasons which are related to one of the
Convention grounds, the causal link is established, whether or not the absence of State
protection is Convention related. Alternatively, where the risk of being persecuted at
the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a Convention ground, but the inability or
unwillingness of the State to offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground. the
causal link is also established.
Id.
154. Id. 1 22.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The increasing recognition of gender claims has not been without
great controversy. Many of its most vocal critics have argued that a
fair interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or the domestic refu-
gee law of the United States, does not encompass such claims. 155
These recent decisions of the tribunals of the United Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Australia present a different perspective. They clearly
stand for the proposition that a social group may be defined by gen-
der, and if the role of the State as well as the individual persecutor is
considered, nexus can easily be established. This approach makes an
invaluable contribution to the evolving jurisprudence and, most nota-
bly, it does so in a way that is entirely consistent with the underlying
principles of the refugee protection regime: to provide surrogate pro-
tection when the individual's country of nationality fails to do so. 156
The recent UNHCR guidelines are significant for affirming this ana-
lytical approach and doing so in a way that is more explicit and direct
than its prior pronouncements on the issue.
The United States has moved in a contradictory and unsteady man-
ner on the issue. The BIA's Matter of Kasinga decision broke new
ground and, although it employed a slightly different rationale than
that of the trilogy of cases herein discussed, it too developed a bifur-
cated analysis, which allowed it to contextualize the claim within the
country and society of the asylum seeker. With the issuance of its
decision in Matter of R-A-, the BIA appeared poised to reverse itself
and negate the progress made with Matter of Kasinga. The vacating of
Matter of R-A- by former Attorney General Janet Reno gave the
United States another opportunity to revisit the issue, and left Matter
of Kasinga as the remaining single most significant relevant precedent
in the United States. When the BIA revisits Matter of R-A-, it can
reach a protection-oriented decision by applying its own Matter of
155. See, e.g., Dan Stein, Gender Asylum Reflects Mistaken Priorities (Human Rights Brief
1996), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humrightbrief/v3i3/stein33.htm (last visited
Feb. 12, 2003) ("Asylum is designed to provide people protection from governments, not prevail-
ing cultural norms,-no matter how much we may dislike them."). Another anti- immigration
activist. Barbara Coe. expressed her opposition to gender asylum with the comment, " 'You get a
punch in the mouth, and you're home free."' Anna Quindlen, Torture Based on Sex Alone.
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10. 2001. at 76 (quoting Barbara Coe).
156. See JAMES HATHAWAY. THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 124 (1991):
[Riefugee law is designed to interpose the protection of the international community
only in situations where there is no reasonable expectation that adequate national pro-
tection of core human rights will be forthcoming. Refugee law is therefore 'substitute
protection' in the sense that it is a response to disenfranchisement from the usual bene-
fits of nationality.
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Kasinga precedent in a manner consonant with the rationale devel-
oped in its three sister-States, as well as the UNHCR. For the United
States to do otherwise would be a regrettable rejection of well-devel-
oped refugee norms, as well as international principles of non-discrim-
ination on the basis of gender.' 57
157. As this article goes to print, there has been a significant development. Attorney General
John Ashcroft has certified Matter o R-A- to himself for decision, and it is rumored that he
intends to re-instate a decision very similar to the original negative decision is-ied by the Board
of Immigration Appeals in 1999. (Letter of certification on file with author)
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